So this is in Hebrew… so I might be wrong.. but it makes reference to the Ressler case in para 7… http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files/03/510/006/r02/03006510.r02.htm

 

7. The court in the case law expanded the standing right of the public petitioner to a great extent. He did so where the issue is of a public nature that has to do with the promotion of the rule of law, the enforcement of constitutional principles, and a place where intervention is required in order to correct a fundamental flaw in public administration. The status of the public petitioner has also been recognized as a place where he can not point to a direct personal touch or personal injury to him (HCJ 4110/92 Hess v. Minister of Defense [8], at 812; HCJ 852/86 Aloni v. Minister of Justice [1], HCJ 1/81 Shiran v. Broadcasting Authority [3], at p. 365). The determination of the policy on the issue of status was influenced to a great extent by the basic and material values ​​regarding the role of judicial review over the system of state authorities. The expansion of the status is part of a broad conception that sees the role of the court not only as a determining factor in a dispute between parties but also as a guardian of the rule of law, even when this role does not involve a decision on the dispute between two parties. "A court in a democratic society has the duty to preserve the rule of law, which means, among other things, that it must enforce the law in the government authorities and must ensure that the government acts in accordance with the law" (HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Defense, (2) 441, 462; HCJ 1759/94 Saruzberg v. Minister of Defense, PD (1) 625, 631; Zamir, Administrative Authority, Vol. I, pp. 81-83). Thus, the status of a public petitioner on various matters of general public importance related to the rule of law in its broad sense and matters of a constitutional nature was recognized even where it has no direct personal interest in the matter of the hearing (HCJ 1635/90 Jerzyevsky v. Prime Minister, (1) 749, 763; HCJ 428/86 Barzilai v. Government of Israel [3], at 505, 558-559).

 

 

Thanks

Do we have any footnotes on this in the Memo you prepared? Or on the Memo we did with Roy?

 

 

Hi Vered,

 

For the legal standing requirement reference… I found this case…where the legal standing requirement was broadened.  HCJ 910/86 Major (Res.) Yehuda Ressler v. minister of Defence which "The legal standing of a petitioner before the High Court will be recognised if he can show that there is a reasonable prospect that an interest of his (not necessarily amounting to a right) which may be shared by a great number of others, has been prejudiced. While the classical rule was that it is not sufficient for a petitioner merely to show that a governmental authority is in breach of the law, without showing prejudice to his own interest, there have developed several important exceptions to this rule, which have the effect of liberalising the rules of locus standi and making them more flexible. Thus, wherever a petitioner can point to an issue of particular public importance or to a serious flaw in the functioning of a public authority, it would only be right for him to bring such a matter to the attention of the Court whose rule is to review the legality of the acts of public authorities. An even more liberal attitude would allow standing to a "public" petitioner in all cases, thus recognising the actio popularis."

 

Do you have any other suggestions of where I could look?

 

Thanks J

 

 

 

Hey

In Shoshi's document the part regarding Jurisdiction and standing is lacking footnotes.

Can you try and add? Do we have any?

Can you do it on track to the attached document please?

Many thanks

Vered